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Heterogeneous information about the term structure, 
least-squares learning and optimal rules for inflation 
targeting 
Bank of Finland Discussion Papers 23/2004 





In this paper we incorporate the term structure of interest rates into a standard 
inflation forecast targeting framework. Learning about the transmission process of 
monetary policy is introduced by having heterogeneous agents – ie central bank 
and private agents – who have different information sets about the future sequence 
of short-term interest rates. We analyse inflation forecast targeting in two 
environments. One in which the central bank has perfect knowledge, in the sense 
that it understands and observes the process by which private sector interest rate 
expectations are generated, and one in which the central bank has imperfect 
knowledge. In the case of imperfect knowledge, the central bank has to learn 
about private sector interest rate expectations, as the latter affect the impact of 
monetary policy through the expectations theory of the term structure of interest 
rates. Here, following Evans and Honkapohja (2001), the learning scheme we 
investigate is that of least-squares learning (recursive OLS) using the Kalman 
filter. We find that optimal monetary policy under learning is a policy that 
separates estimation and control. Therefore, this model suggests that the practical 
relevance of the breakdown of the separation principle and the need for 
experimentation in policy may be limited. 
 
Key words: learning, rational expectations, separation principle, Kalman filter, 
term structure of interest rates 
 
JEL classification numbers: C53, E43, E52, F33  
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Heterogeeninen tieto korkojen aikarakenteesta, 
PNS-oppiminen ja optimaaliset inflaatiotavoitteet 
Suomen Pankin keskustelualoitteita 23/2004 





Tässä tutkimuksessa sisällytetään korkojen aikarakenne tavalliseen inflaatio-
tavoitekehikkoon. Rahapolitiikan välittymismekanismia koskeva oppiminen on 
otettu mukaan siten, että keskuspankilla ja yksityisillä taloudenpitäjillä on eri 
informaatio korkojen tulevasta aikaurasta. Inflaatioennusteiden kontrollointiin pe-
rustuvaa rahapolitiikkaa analysoidaan kahdessa tilanteessa. Niistä ensimmäisessä 
keskuspankilla on täydellinen tietämys siinä mielessä, että se tuntee yksityisen 
sektorin inflaatio-odotusten muodostumisprosessin. Toisessa taas tietämys 
keskuspankin odotusten muodostumisesta on epätäydellistä. Epätäydellisen tietä-
myksen tapauksessa keskuspankin on opittava yksityisen sektorin korko-odotuk-
set, koska niillä on vaikutusta rahapolitiikan välittymiseen korkorakenteen 
odotusteorian mukaisesti. Tässä tarkastellaan Evansin ja Honkapohjan (2001) 
esittämää oppimisprosessia, joka perustuu rekursiivista pienimmän neliösumman 
menetelmää käyttävään Kalmanin suotimeen. Osoittautuu, että oppimiseen 
perustuvassa optimaalisessa rahapolitiikassa estimointi- ja kontrolliongelmat ovat 
erillisiä, toisin kuin on väitetty. Tämän tutkimuksen mallitarkastelu viittaa näin 
ollen siihen, että separoituvuusperiaatteen väitetyn pettämisen ja siten politiikka-
kokeiden käytännöllinen merkitys voi olla vähäinen. 
 
Avainsanat: oppiminen, rationaaliset odotukset, separoituvuusperiaate, Kalmanin 
suodin, korkojen aikarakenne 
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As pointed out by Bullard (1991), in the three decades since the publication of the 
seminal work on rational expectations (RE) in the early 1960s, a steely paradigm 
was forged in the economics profession regarding acceptable modelling 
procedures. Simply stated, the paradigm was that economic actors do not persist 
in making foolish mistakes in forecasting over time.  
  Since the late 1980s researchers have challenged this paradigm by examining 
the idea that how systematic forecast errors are eliminated may have important 
implications for macroeconomic policy. Researchers who have focused on this 
question have been studying what is called ‘learning’, because any method of 
expectations formation is known as a learning mechanism. Thus, since the late 
1980s a learning literature, or learning paradigm, developed. An excellent 
introduction to – and survey of – this paradigm is presented in Evans and 
Honkapohja (2001).  
  A different strand of literature in the economics profession has been dealing 
with optimal control or dynamic optimisation.  
  In general there are few papers in the literature that combine the themes of 
learning and (optimal) control. An exception is recent and important work by 
Wieland (2000a,b). Wieland (2000a) analyses the situation where a central bank 
has limited information concerning the transmission channel of monetary policy. 
Then, the CB is faced with the difficult task of simultaneously controlling the 
policy target and estimating (learning) the impact of policy actions. Thus, the so-
called separation principle does not hold, and a trade-off between estimation and 
control arises because policy actions influence estimation (learning) and provide 
information that may improve future performance. Wieland analyses this trade-off 
in a simple model with parameter uncertainty and conducts dynamic simulations 
of the central bank’s decision problem.  
  In this paper we incorporate the term structure of interest rates in a standard 
inflation forecast targeting framework. Learning about the transmission process of 
monetary policy is introduced by having heterogeneous agents – ie the central 
bank and private agents – who have different information sets about the future 
sequence of short-term interest rates. We analyse inflation forecast targeting in 
two environments. One in which the central bank has perfect knowledge, in the 
sense that it understands and observes the process by which private sector interest 
rate expectations are generated, and one in which the central bank has imperfect 
knowledge and has to learn the private sector forecasting rule for short-term 
interest rates. In the case of imperfect knowledge, the central bank has to learn 
about private sector interest rate expectations, as the latter affect the impact of 
monetary policy through the expectations theory of the term structure of interest 
rates. Here following Evans and Honkapohja (2001), the learning scheme we  
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investigate is that of least-squares learning (recursive OLS) using the Kalman 
filter.  
  We find that optimal monetary policy under learning is a policy that separates 
estimation and control. Therefore, this model suggests that the practical relevance 
of the breakdown of the separation principle and the need for experimentation in 
policy may be limited. 
  The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 and 3 discusses 
the basic inflation targeting framework and the term structure of interest rates. In 
Section 4 we solve for the optimal monetary policy rule under perfect knowledge. 
Imperfect knowledge and the Kalman filter are introduced in Section 5. We 
conclude in Section 6. The appendices contain the derivation of results for 
convergence and the optimal policy rules under perfect knowledge and learning. 
 
 
2 The  environment 
Monetary policy is conducted by a central bank that controls a short-term nominal 
interest rate it, and that has an exogenously given inflation target, π*. The 
authorities aim to minimize deviations of inflation from its assigned target.
1 
Consequently, the central bank will choose a sequence of current and future short-
term nominal interest rates to meet the objective 
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Here π is the inflation (rate) in year t, π* is the central bank’s inflation target, 
while the parameter δ (which fulfils 0 < δ < 1) denotes the discount factor (ie a 
measure of the policy horizon). The expectations operator E refers to the 
policymaker’s expectations. This expectation is conditional on the central bank’s 
information set in period t. 
  As in Rudebusch and Svensson (2002), inflation and output are linked by the 
following short-term Phillips-curve relationship:
2 
 
1 t t 1 t 1 t z + + η − α + π = π  (2.2) 
 
                                                 
1 The objective function assumes strict inflation targeting. An obvious question is whether the 
results in the paper would – in broad terms – still go through for flexible inflation targeting (that is 
in the case of additional objectives like output stabilisation and interest rate smoothing)? 
Preliminary results (not reported here) indicate that this is indeed the case. 
2 Rudebusch and Svensson (2002) consider additional lags of inflation.  
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The variable z represents the (log of the) output gap in period t where potential 
output has been normalized to zero, finally η is a i.i.d productivity (supply) shock 
  The output gap is determined by the following dynamic relationship: 
 
1 t t 2 t 1 1 t d R z z + + + β − β =  (2.3) 
 
where R is the long-term real interest rate and d is an i.i.d. demand shock. Again, 
this relationship is similar to Rudebusch and Svensson (2002). The differences are 
that here the output gap depends on the long-term real interest rate rather than the 
short-term real interest rate, and that they consider an additional lagged z term. 
  Note that from equation (2.3) it appears as if the setting is completely 
backward looking. The output gap seems to depend only on lagged variables and 
not on expectations of future variables as in the micro-founded New Keynesian 
model. However, this is not the entirely true. In Section 3 below we show that the 
combination of the IS curve and the term structure implies the presence of 
forward looking elements in the model that makes our (semi-reduced form) IS 
curve behave quite a bit like the New Keynesian IS curve as employed by Clarida, 
Gali and Gertler (1999). 
  We assume that the short real rate (rt) and the long real rate (Rt) are related by 
the following version of the Pure Expectations Hypothesis (PEH) 
 
) R R E ˆ ( D R r t 1 t t t t − − = +  (2.4’) 
 
The expectations operator Ê refers to the private sector’s expectations. Here rt 
represents the real yield to maturity on a one-period bond which is traded on the 
interbank money market. The expectations operator Ê refers to private agents’ 
(possibly subjective) expectations. The LHS denotes the (one-period) real holding 
period return on a long-term bond. The latter’s real yield to maturity (Rt) is the 
long-term real interest rate. The parameter D is defined such that D + 1 is equal to 
Maccaulay’s duration.
3 
  For our purposes it turns out to be convenient to rewrite this equation to 
express the current long real rate as a convex combination of the current short real 




k R E ˆ k r ) k 1 ( R ; 1 t t t t +
≡ + − = +  (2.4) 
 
Note that the long and short real interest rates will be equal if the parameter k is 
equal to zero. In that case the duration of the long-term bond will be equal to one 
                                                 
3 For more details see Eijffinger, Schaling and Verhagen (2000), hereafter ESV.  
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and there is no distinction between short and long term interest rates. Note that 
this equation can be rewritten as 
 







− τ ∑ − =  
 
Or alternatively, as 
 







− τ ∑ − + − =  
 



















1 t t  (2.5) 
 
Thus, in equation (2.4) the long term real interest rate is a weighted average of the 
current ex ante real short rate and the expected future sequence of future short real 
rates over the t + 1 – infinity horizon. 
  The current short-term real interest rate will be equal to: 
 
1 t t t t E i r + π − =  (2.6) 
 
Here it is the instrument of the central bank (ie the nominal interest rate on the 
interbank money market) and Etπt+1 represents the expected rate of inflation in 




3  The role of forward looking elements and 
comparison with the New Keynesian model 
Before we proceed to solving the model for an inflation targeting central bank, it 
is worthwhile pointing out some features of the semi-reduced form implied by 
equations (2.3) to (2.6). For the moment we abstract from the term structure by 
setting k = 0. 
  In that case the duration of the long-term bond will be equal to one and there 
is no distinction between short and long term interest rates. Then, (2.3) collapses 
to: 
 
1 t 1 t t t 2 t 1 1 t d ) E i ( z z + + + + π − β − β =  
 
This is in marked contrast to the micro-founded New Keynesian model (NKM). 
Here we mean the IS curve of Clarida, Gali and Gertler (CGG) (1999), namely: 
 
t 1 t t t 1 t t t g ) E i ( z E z + π − ϕ − = + +  
 
As pointed out by CGG this equation is obtained by log-linearizing the 
consumption Euler equation that arises from the household’s optimal saving 
decision. The resulting expression differs from the traditional IS curve (2.3) – 
apart from the effect of the term structure – mainly because current output 
depends on expected future output as well as the (ex ante) short real interest rate. 
Higher expected future output raises current output: Because individuals prefer to 
smooth consumption, expectation of higher consumption next period (associated 
with higher expected output) leads them to want to consume more today, which 
raises current output demand. The negative effect of the real rate on current 
output, in turn, reflects intertemporal substitution of consumption. In this respect, 
the interest elasticity in the IS curve, ϕ, corresponds to the intertemporal elasticity 
of substitution. Finally, gt can be interpreted as a demand shock. 
  Translated into our notation we get: 
 
t 1 t t t 2 1 t t t d ) E i ( z E z + π − β − = + +  (3.1’) 
 
So, apart from the term structure the IS curve of the NKM differs in two ways 
from the Rudebusch–Svensson equation: a) current output depends on expected 
future output rather than on past output, and b) the parameter β2 is micro founded,  
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namely it is no longer a free ad hoc parameter but is equal to the intertemporal 
elasticity of substitution.
4 
  CGG point out that it is possible to iterate their IS equation (in our notation 





+ + + + + π − β − =
0 i
i t i 1 t 1 t 2 t t } d ] i [ { E z  (3.1) 
 
According to CGG this equation illustrates the degree to which beliefs about the 
future affect current aggregate activity within the NKM. The output gap depends 
not only on the current real rate and the demand shock, but also on the expected 
future paths of these two variables. 
  At this stage it is interesting to compare the above equation and the 
implications of the forward looking term structure. To keep things simple, for the 
moment abstract from the backward looking elements in the IS curve. So, for now 
we set β1 = 0. Then, equation (2.3) collapses to 
 
1 t t 2 1 t d R z + + + β − =  
 










+ + − β − = ∑  (3.2) 
 
Let us now compare our result (3.2) with CGG (3.1). 
  We see that in CGG the current level of activity depends on beliefs about 
future short real interest rates and demand shocks. In our model – with the term 
structure switched on so k > 0, but no output persistence so β1 = 0 – the future 
level of output depends on beliefs about future short real rates. The reason that the 
‘dependent variable’ is future rather than current output is because of the control 
lag of monetary policy. Policy does not control the present level of output (as in 
CGG) but next year’s level of output (as in our model and Rudebusch–Svensson). 
  So, apart from the fact that beliefs about the future do not include the demand 
shock d, the only difference between our ‘IS curve’
5 and the New Keynesian IS 
curve is the one-year control lag of monetary policy. Table 3.1 summarizes. 
 
                                                 
4 There is no real difference with respect to the demand shock as in both specifications the effect 
of the demand shock on output is contemporaneous (dt+1 → zt+1 versus dt → zt). 
5 Used here as shorthand for the combination of the IS curve and the term structure equation.  
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Table 3.1  Effects of the term structure versus the 
      New Keynesian IS Curve 
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+ + + + + π − β − =
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j t j 1 t j t 2 t t } d ] i [ { E z 
 
 
So, an interesting result to emerge from this Section is that the presence of the 
term structure in our model generates forward looking elements that have 
implications very similar to those implied by the New Keynesian IS curve in the 
CGG model that does not include a term structure. To recap, in the CGG 
framework the forward looking IS curve implies that the output gap depends not 
only on the current real rate and the demand shock, but also on the expected future 
paths of these two variables. In turn, using the combination of a traditional IS 
curve plus an explicit term structure equation generates a similar result – provided 
that the degree of inertia in the IS curve is low. 
  Let’s now look at the general case, where there are forward looking elements 
in the model (so k > 0), and where now the inertia in the IS curve is also allowed 
to play a role (so β1 > 0). 
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So, the output gap depends not only on the lagged long real interest rate and the 
current demand shock, but also on the entire past path of these two variables. 
  Combining this result with the term structure (2.4) we get: 
 
                                                 
6 We have used that 
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1 t } d r E ˆ k ) k 1 ( L { ) L ( z  (3.3) 
 
Let’s now contrast the general result (3.3) (ie the case where k > 0 and β1 > 0) 
with CGG (3.1). 
  We see that in CGG the current level of activity depends on beliefs about 
future short real interest rates and demand shocks. In our model – with the term 
structure present so k > 0, and with non-zero output persistence so β1 > 0 – the 
present level of output depends on the entire past history of long real rates and 
demand shocks. However, since the long real rate is equal to the expected 
sequence of future short rates we have a complex interplay of forward looking and 
backward looking elements. 
  So, with the term structure switched on the contrast between our ‘IS curve’ 
and the New Keynesian IS curve is less stark: like CGG in our model beliefs 
about future interest rates do affect current economic activity. However, unlike 
CGG here these beliefs only affect the current level of output through various 
lags. Table 3.2 summarizes. 
 
Table 3.2  The ‘IS curve’ versus the New Keynesian IS curve 
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4 Implementing  inflation  targeting under perfect 
knowledge 
To get some straightforward results, we assume that the central bank understands 
and observes the process by which private sector inflation expectations are 
generated. This is the benchmark case of perfect knowledge. We model least-
squares learning by the central bank in section 5. 
 
 
4.1  Timing of events 
The timing is that first the private sector (PS) sets its expectation about the 
sequence of future short real rates – that is, it chooses ÊtRt+1 – and the central 
bank (CB) then chooses rt (through the choice of it, given Êtπt+1 = Etπt+1). The 
policymaker’s best response, rt(πt, zt, Et[Êt 1 t R + ]) maximizes the monetary  
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authority’s payoff given Et[Êt 1 t R + ]. The model is completed by imposing rational 
expectations on the policymaker, namely, Et[Et 1 t R ˆ
+ ] = Êt 1 t R + . More specific, in 
the case of perfect knowledge the CB understands and observes the process by 
which PS interest rate expectations are generated.
7 How those expectations are 
generated remains to be specified. The equilibrium ex ante real interest rate is 
given by the solution of this equation, and is denoted by  ]) R E ˆ [ E , z , ( r 1 t t t t t
*
t + π . To 
summarize, the above case of discretion can be represented as follows. Then, also 
at time t the CB sets the interest rate based on strict inflation targeting (SIT) and 
on its correct observation of PS expectations. Figure 4.1 illustrates. 
 
Table 4.1  Discretion: timing of events 
 
Time t 
Stage 1:  Stage 2: 
•  PS forecasts sequence of future 
interest rates, ie sets ÊtRt+1. 
•  CB decides on monetary policy 
according to strict IFT, ie sets 
). R , E ˆ , z , ( r 1 t t t t
*









2 t t E π = π +  (4.1) 
 
Substituting from the constraints it can easily be established that can be easily 





















+ π − π
− β α
=  (4.2) 
 
Note that rule (4.2) can be written in different ways, including forms without 
1 t tR E ˆ
+  as in the REE the forecasts are a function of current endogenous variables. 
We show this in Section 4.3 below, the relevant form of the rule is then equation 
(4.8). 
                                                 
7 So, the central bank knows how much policy ‘is in the pipeline’ according to financial markets. 
8 See Bullard and Schaling (2001) and Schaling (2004) for examples of the method of solving for 
the optimal policy.  
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  The difference with standard Taylor-type monetary policy rules is that now 
the CB responds to three state variables: inflation, output and the private sector 
forecast of the long real rate. If k→0 there is no term structure, and the policy rule 
collapses to Svensson’s (1997) version of the Taylor rule (hereafter the Svensson–
Taylor rule). 
  An interesting characteristic of this solution is that the central bank’s optimal 
level of short-rates is inversely related to PS expectations about its future short 
rates (because of the minus sign on the term EtRt+1). For example, if the PS 
expects rates to go up in the future, as a consequence (ceteris paribus; given its 
inflation target) rates can be lower today (and vice versa). The latter (reverse 
case), ie the PS expects rates to go down, and as a consequence the CB raises (or 
talks about raising them) reminds us of the old joke about the Bundesbank: ‘The 
BuBA is just like cream, the more you stir it, the thicker it gets’.
9 The reason for 
this is that the central bank’s inflation forecast – given other state variables such 
as the present inflation rate and the present output gap – depends on the present 
level of the real long term interest rate, Rt. So, an optimal forecast implies an 
optimal level of this variable. Since the optimal long-term rate (that is consistent 
with strict IT) is a weighted average of the present ex ante optimal real rate and 




t R E ˆ k r ) k 1 ( R + + − = , the higher ÊtRt+1 the lower the optimal ex ante 
real rate can be. Similarly lower expected interest rates necessitate a tighter policy 
stance today to compensate. 
  An important limiting case of equation (4.2) is when k→0 and there is no 














+ π − π
β α
=  (4.3) 
 
which – as in Svensson (1997, p. 1119) – is essentially a version of the simple 
policy rule popularized by Taylor (1993).




4.3  The rational expectations solution 
It remains to present the rational expectations solution. This is the case where 
private sector interest rate expectations are formed rationally; ie private agents 
                                                 
9 In addition, the Deutsche Bundesbank always considered the long-term interest rate as a 
reflection of the credibility of its monetary policy. 
10 Taylor rules are often written in terms of nominal interest rates, but given the definition of rt the 
rules in equations (4.2) and (4.3) can easily be interpreted in these terms.  
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think that the CB will implement inflation forecast targeting in each and every 
period. That is, they think that the CB will set policy according to Etπt+2 = π*∀t. 
  As a first step, solve for the long-term real interest rate. Substituting (4.2) into 













+ π − π
β α
=  (4.4) 
 






t 1 t d
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z z + + + π − π
α
− − =  (4.5) 
 
Leading equation (4.4) by one period and substituting from equations (2.2) and 
(4.5) we get 
 






1 t u z R + + +
β
β
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=  is a composite white noise shock, ie a linear 
combination of the demand and supply shocks (both white noise). Rearranging 








1 t t z R E ˆ
β
β
− π − π
β α
β
− = +  (4.7) 
 
This is now the solution for the rational expectation of next period’s long real rate 
from the perspective of the private sector. Note that the benchmark case of the 
model, that of perfect knowledge, relates to the situation where both the 
policymaker, and the private sector have rational expectations. More specific, in 
the case of perfect knowledge the CB understands and observes the process by 
which PS interest rate expectations are generated. In turn those expectations are 
consistent with the solution for the long-term real interest rate implied by strict IT. 


















β + β +
+ π − π
− β α
β +
=  (4.8) 
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This equation is the equivalent of equation (3.6) of Eijffinger, Schaling and 
Verhagen (2000) (ESV).
11 However, the equations are not strictly comparable 
because the optimal real interest rate in ESV is in ex post terms, whereas in (4.8) 
it is in ex ante terms. 
 
 
4.4  Comparing the rules 
It is interesting to compare the optimal rule (4.8) with the Svensson-Taylor rule 
(4.3). 
  Comparing the coefficients for inflation and output gap respectively, we see 

























That means the primary feature of the optimal rule is that the interest rate appears 
to be more volatile than according to the Svensson–Taylor rule. The intuition 
behind this result is as follows. 
  From equation (4.8) we see that the optimal response of the short-term interest 
rate to its determinants becomes stronger if the duration of the long bond (D) 
increases – that is the parameter k becomes larger. This result is driven by a 
decrease in policy leverage over the long real rate, since the latter will now to a 
greater extent be determined by expected future short real rates at the expense of 
the  present short real rate. However, provided central bank preferences are 
constant over time, a change in duration will not alter the central bank’s optimal 
intermediate target as expressed in equation (4.1). Therefore, the central bank will 
have to manipulate its instrument more aggressively, in order to attain the same 
desired effect on the long-term real interest rate. 
 
 
                                                 
11 However, the equations are not completely identical because the optimal real interest rate in 
ESV is in ex post terms, whereas in (4.8) it is in ex ante terms.  
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5 Implementing  inflation  targeting under learning 
The case of perfect knowledge can be represented as follows. First, at time t the 
central bank sets its expectation (forecast) for private sector interest rate 
expectations. Next, also at time t the private sector sets its forecast, ÊtRt+1 = xt+1, 
of the long term real interest rate for period t+1. Then, the CB sets the interest rate 
at time t based on its own forecast of the long-term real interest rate, where – 
importantly – the forecast turns out to be correct. 
  The main problem in practice for a central bank is that private sector agents – 
financial analysts, investment bankers, institutional investors, etc – have become 
more and more sophisticated in analyzing and predicting future monetary policy 
actions of the central bank. This increased degree of sophistication of private 
sector agents makes it harder for the central bank to understand private sector 
expectations. Hence, the idea that the CB can forecast or – what is actually 
equivalent – observe xt+1 = ÊtRt+1 without error is hardly realistic.
12 This 
assumption will now be relaxed. 
 
 
5.1  The Kalman filter 
Suppose the CB can no longer forecast private agents’ interest rate expectations 
xt+1 without error. Assume that the CB has a forecast Etyt+1 at time t of xt+1 which 
it subsequently uses to set the short-term interest rate tt at time t. 
  More specifically, let yt be the CB’s noisy signal on xt 
 
t t t x y ε + =  (5.1) 
 
where yt is the central bank’s signal of xt, and εt is its measurement error.
13 The 
only information available to the CB when it sets policy at time t is its forecast of 
y which is conditional on past values of y; ie E[yt+1|t] = E[yt+1|yt+1–n, n = 1,2,…]. 
Even ex post, the CB cannot observe separately the two components of y, x and 
                                                 
12 Strictly speaking one should make a distinction between seeing the value of expectations vs 
knowing that forecasts are rational, ie knowing the RE forecast function of the private sector. 
More generally, one could instead assume that CB sees private expectations but does not know 
that they are rational. 
13 Subscript ‘t’ denotes variables that are observed or determined at time t, except for the variables 
x and y where the subscript t refers to the time period for which the expectation, x, or its noisy 
observation, y, is held.  
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ε.
14 We assume the measurement error is normally distributed with mean zero and 
variance 
2
ε σ . So, the central bank’s signal is unbiased, but not without error. An 
important limiting case of (5.1) is when  0
2 → σε  and we are back to the previous 
case of perfect knowledge, ie yt = xt. 
  To make the problem more tractable we set α1 = 1  and  π* = 0.  These 
assumptions have the advantage of reducing the dimension of the state space in 
the central bank’s optimal filtering problem. In this way we avoid what 
Ljungqvist and Sargent (2000) call the ‘curse of dimensionality’.
15 
  Under the above simplifying assumptions equation (4.7) reduces to 
 
) z ( w and / where w w x 1 t 1 t 1 t 2 1 1 t 1 t
2
1
t − − − − − − π − ≡ β β ≡ γ γ =
β
β
=  (4.7’) 
 
Note that the situation above can be represented as the case where the CB believes 
that private sector interest rate expectations follow the stochastic process 
 
t 1 t t w y ε + γ = −  (5.2) 
 
corresponding to the true (actual) law of motion of PS interest rate expectations, 
but that γ is unknown to it (this can be seen by substituting the expression for 
private sector interest rate expectations (4.7’) into equation (5.1)). Thus, here we 
assume that the central bank employs a reduced form of the expectations 
formation process that is correctly specified.
16 
  So, we assume that equation (5.2) is the perceived law of motion (PLM) of the 
central bank and that the policymaker attempts to estimate γ. Following Evans and 
Honkapohja (2001), this is our key bounded rationality assumption: we back away 
from the rational expectations assumption, replacing it with the assumption that, 
in forecasting private sector inflation expectations, the central bank acts like an 
econometrician. 
  The central bank’s estimates will be updated over time as more information is 
collected. Letting ct–1 denote its estimate through time t–1, the central bank’s one-
step-ahead forecast at t–1, is given by 
                                                 
14 A real world counterpart of our signal processing can be that CBs may get data on PS interest 
rate expectations (say interest rate futures), which is then taken as a signal of the true PS 
expectation. Here we focus on one learner: the CB (whose rationality is thus bounded), and let’s 
assume the PS has rational expectations (rationality not bounded). In future we may want to look 
at two-sided learning where both the PS and the CB are learning. 
15 For the technical details see Appendix D of Schaling (2003). 
16 Instead – as pointed out by Orphanides and Williams (2002) – the learner may be uncertain of 
the correct from and estimate a more general specification, for example, in our case a linear 
regression with additional lags of expected inflation which nests (5.2).  
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1 t 1 t t 1 t w c ] y [ E − − − =  (5.3) 
 
Under this assumption we have the following model of the evolution of the 
economy. Let Ωt be the central bank’s information set for time t. Suppose that at 
time t–1 the central bank has data on the economy from periods τ = t–1,…,t–n. 
Thus the time t–1 information set is Ωt–1 = 
1 t
n t } w , y {
−
− = τ τ τ . Imagine that we have 
already calculated the ordinary least squares estimate ct–1 of γ in the model 
) , w ; y (
2
2 t 1 t ε − − σ γ . Given the new information, which is provided by the 
observations yt, wt–1, we wish to form a revised or updated estimate of γ. Here ct is 
the CB’s OLS estimate of γ in the model  ) , w ; y (
2
1 t t ε − σ γ . 
  The timing of events is summarized in Table 5.1 below. 
 
Table 5.1  Imperfect knowledge: timing of events 
 
Time t 
Stage 1:  Stage 2:  Stage 3: 
•  CB forecasts PS 
interest rate 
expectations using ct 
and wt; ie sets 
[] [] 1 t t 1 t t y E x E + + = . 
•  2a) PS forecasts long-
term real interest rate, 
ie sets  t 1 t w x γ = +  
•  2b) CB decides on 
monetary policy, ie 
sets  () ] y [ E , z , r 1 t t t t
*
t + π .
•  3a) Nature chooses 
εt+1, and 
1 t 1 t 1 t x y + + + ε + =  
realizes. 
•  3b) CB observes the 
signal yt+1 and forms a 
revised estimate ct+1. 
•  Back to stage 1, for 
time t = t+1 etc. 
 
 
Using data through period t, the least squares regression parameter for equation 
(5.2) can be written in recursive form (see Appendix D of Schaling (2003) for 
details) 
 
() 1 t 1 t t t 1 t t c w y c c − − − − κ + =  (5.4) 
 
1 t 1 t t 1 t t p w p p − − − κ − =  (5.5a) 
 
1 2
1 t t t ) ( w p
−
ε − σ = κ  (5.5b) 
 
The method by which the revised estimate of γ is obtained may be described as a 




1 t t t ) ( w p
−
ε − σ = κ  may be described as the gain of the filter, ie the 
Kalman gain. 
  Equations (5.4) and (5.5a) are known as the updating, or smoothing equations. 
These updating equations represent the learning channel, through which the 
current realizations of inflation and the output gap
17 affects next period’s estimate 
or beliefs bt+1, where b is a 1 x 2 row vector of state variables containing the mean 
and variance of the estimate, ie bt = [ct pt]’. 
 
 
5.2  The case of passive learning 
In order to get some analytical results, we now consider the case of passive 
learning. This is the case where the central bank disregards the effect of current 
policy actions on future estimation and prediction. In this case the policy maker 
treats control and estimation separately. 
  The central bank will first choose rt to minimise the expected loss based on its 
current parameter estimate (its belief about γ). Then, a white noise shock εt+1 
occurs and a new realization yt+1 can be observed. Before choosing next period’s 
control rt+1 the central bank will proceed by updating its estimate (belief) using the 
new information (wt, yt+1). 
  In case of imperfect knowledge – and a passive learning policy in which the 
central bank separates estimation and control, see Wieland (2000b, 506–507) – 
that is a central bank who does not internalize the effect of current policy actions 
























=  (5.6) 
 
where the central bank’s forecast of market expectations of future rates is 
governed by 
 
t t 1 t t t w c ] R E ˆ [ E = +  (5.7) 
 
Plugging (5.7) in equation (5.6), we get the solution for the central bank’s policy 
























=  (5.8) 
                                                 
17 Note that wt ≡ (–πt – zt)  
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(For a proof see Appendix 3). Note that now we have four state variables in the 
policy rule: inflation, output, the existing parameter estimate, and nominal GDP.
18 
In addition to raising interest rates in response to inflation and output being above 
target and trend, respectively, the central bank now also responds to the level of 
‘nominal GDP’. Note that the GDP term in the interest rate rule does not occur 
because the level of GDP enters the central bank’s loss function.
19 
  If ‘nominal GDP’ πt + zt is above (below) its target level (of zero), the central 
bank raises (lowers) short-term interest rates. The reason it does this, is that the 
central bank’s optimal level of short-rates is inversely related to its expectation of 
the PS expectations about its future rates γwt, which in turn is inversely related to 
the level of GDP (wt = (–πt – zt)).
20 Thus, the central bank’s optimal level of 
short-rates is inversely related to its expectation of the PS expectations about its 
future short rates. For example, if the CB expects the PS to expect that rates go up 
in the future, as a consequence (ceteris paribus) short-term interest rates can be 
lower today (and vice versa). 
  We also find that – in so far as ‘nominal GDP’ is concerned – the policy rule 
now becomes state-contingent, as the parameter c is in general unequal to γ, and 
moves in real time. This means that the central bank’s optimal response to the 
deviation of ‘nominal GDP’ and its target level also becomes state-contingent. 
Over time the estimate converges (for a proof, see Appendix 1) to the true 
parameter and the policy under passive learning converges to optimal monetary 




5.3  Optimal monetary policy under learning 
We now examine how the nature of optimal monetary policy is affected by 
learning considerations. Under imperfect knowledge the central bank chooses 
∞
= τ τ t } r {  so as to maximize 
 
                                                 
18 Or three state variables, if we split-up nominal GDP in inflation and output. In fact strictly 
speaking the level of nominal GDP does not enter the rule as we have the sum of the level of 
output and the inflation rate, rather than the price level. We would get nominal GDP if we 
normalize the lagged price level pt–1 to zero though. In what follows we therefore use ‘nominal 
GDP’ as shorthand for the sum of the output gap and the inflation rate. 
19 For a recent paper where the central bank targets nominal income growth, see Mitra (2003). 
20 The occurrence of the third GDP term in the policy rule is not, however, a general result. It 
depends on the specific simplifying assumptions made about the slope of the Phillips curve and the 
level of the inflation target. 
21 With α1 = 1, π* = 0, and Et 1 t R ˆ
+ = γwt = –γ(πt + zt), where γ = β1
1
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E  (A2.1’) 
 
subject to (2.2) and 
 
'
1 t t t 2 t 2 t t 2 1 1 t d kc r ) k 1 ( z ) kc ( z + + + π β + − β − β + β =  (A3.3) 
 
t 1 t y θ = +  (A4.2) 
 
t t t t t t 1 t c )) z ( 1 ( c θ ϖ + + π ϖ + = +  (A4.3) 
 
t 1 t ϖ = κ +  (A4.4) 
 
1 2
t t t 1 t ) )( z (
−
ε + σ + π ψ − = κ  (A4.5) 
 
t t t t 1 t p )) z ( 1 ( p + π ω + = +  (A4.6) 
 
t 1 t p ψ = +  (A4.7) 
 
Note that nonlinearities enter the problem in five places. First, the output equation 
becomes nonlinear. This can be seen from the presence of the ‘product terms’ ctzt 
and ctπt on the right-hand side of (A3.3). There is a third nonlinearity, as the 
product terms ctzt and ctπt on the right-hand side of the updating equation (A4.3) 
are multiplied by the Kalman gain κt+1 = ϖt. Since the prediction variance also 
moves over time, we have two more nonlinearites. First, the Kalman gain in 
equation (A4.5) depends on the products of the prediction variance pt+1 = ψt and 
the inflation and output realizations πt and zt. Second, the prediction variance 
itself is governed by the nonlinear first-order difference equation (A4.6). 
  In Appendix 4 we show that the first-order condition can be expressed as 
 
0 E 2 t t = π +  (A3.6) 
 
which is identical to the FOC for the cases of passive learning (see Appendix 3) 
and perfect knowledge (see Appendix 2). This means that the optimal policy is 
identical to the passive policy. Put differently, estimation and control can be 
separated and the so-called separation principle holds. Therefore, we can now 




5.4  Comparing optimal policy under perfect knowledge 
and learning 
Now we compare the optimal rule under learning with the optimal rule under 
prefect knowledge. We use standard, illustrative values for α1, β1 and β2. We 




2 = σ = ση . Table 5.2 summarizes the parameter values. 
 
Table 5.2  Parameter Configuration
1 
 
Parameter Controls  Value 
1 α   Response of inflation to the output gap  1 
1 β   Output persistence  0.7 
2 β   Elasticity of the output gap with respect to the long-term 
real interest rate  1 
k  Duration of the long bond  0.5 
2
d σ   Variance of the shock to the output gap  0.078 
2
η σ   Variance of the supply shock  0.078 
* π   Policymaker’s inflation target  0 
2
ε σ   Variance of the measurement error   1 
0 p  Initial value of the prediction variance  3 
0 c  Initial value of the parameter estimate  0.75 
γ  True value of the parameter  0.7 
1We illustrate our analytical findings using these calibrations. 
 
 
In Figures 5.1 and 5.2 we display the first 100 of 10.000 observations on the 
short-term ex ante real interest rate for both the optimal rule under perfect 
knowledge and the optimal rule under learning. We use 100 observations to keep 
the Figure relatively clear. Both systems are calculated based on the same realized 
sequence of shocks. As can be seen from Table 5.3, the primary feature of the 
optimal rule under learning is that the interest rate exhibits less persistence than 
the interest rate under perfect knowledge. This feature reflects the phenomenon 
that the latter rule is linear in state with constant parameters, whereas the optimal 
rule under learning is state-contingent, ie has time-dependent coefficients that 




Figure 5.1  Short-term interest rate – optimal rule under 
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Figure 5.2  Short-term interest rate – optimal rule under 
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Figure 5.3  Optimal learning – convergence of the parameter 
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Figure 5.4  Optimal learning – prediction variance of the 















Table 5.3  Summary statistics of first 100 observations 
 
Case  Rule under perfect knowledge  rule under learning 
Mean   –0.03579    0.12795 
Variance   1.94518    1.89131 
Coefficient for AR(1) term    –0.3988    –0.2666 
 
 
Due to convergence to the true parameter in the learning case, the two rules are 
almost identical in the last 100 observations. Therefore those observations are not 
shown. We illustrate convergence with Figures 5.3 and 5.4. 
 
 
6  Evaluation and concluding remarks 
In this Section we put our main result – that the optimal policy under learning 
coincides with the passive policy, ie that the optimal policy can separate 
estimation and control – in the context of the dual control literature. We 
informally discuss how a trade-off between estimation and control might resurface 
in our model, but find the argument unconvincing. 
  It is interesting to observe that our one-period objective function differs from 





t t t ) r r ( ) y y ( ) r , y ( L − λ + − =  (6.1) 
 
(where he sets  0 r
*
t = ). Thus, in his set-up both the control rt and the signal yt 
affect the agent’s pay-off. A similar objective function is used by Beck and 
Wieland (2002) and Kiefer and Nyarko (1989). Apparently, the loss function (6.1) 
is standard in the dual control literature. 
  In the literature on learning and control, the stochastic process to be controlled 
is usually static in nature. Using the notation of this paper 
 
t t t r y ε + β + α =  (6.2) 
 
where yt is the target variable and rt is the control variable.
22 Under perfect 
knowledge of α and β, rt will be a function of these parameters and as such will be 
constant. With this type of constraint the optimal value of the control variable 
under passive learning is a function of the estimates of parameters (certainty-
                                                 
22 An example is Wieland (2000a,b) who studies the problem of a single decision maker, who 
attempts to control a linear stochastic process with two unknown parameters, just like (6.2).  
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equivalence rule) or a function of the parameter estimates and their variances and 
covariances (myopic rule). Kiefer and Nyarko (1989) show that beliefs and 
actions rt converge in the limit. However, the risk is that if rt converges too 
quickly, then beliefs may also converge to incorrect values. The need for policy 
experimentation is therefore relevant here. 
  The story is different if the process to be controlled is dynamic and the RHS 
includes the lagged dependent variable, say 
 
t 1 t t t y r y ε + δ + β + α = −  (6.3) 
 
In this case, under learning the optimal value of rt will be a function of the 
parameter estimates and yt–1. In essence at any point in time, rt will be reacting to 
past shocks hitting yt–1 and thus actions rt will never converge (or settle down). 
The upshot is that as long as the policy maker chooses to react to the state variable 
yt–1, the control variable rt will also be stochastic. Kiefer and Nyarko (1989) have 
shown that beliefs would converge with probability 1 to the truth if actions rt do 
not converge. This finding implies that with the RHS variables (rt and yt–1) 
showing variations, beliefs will converge with probability 1 to the truth. 
  In our paper, instead of (6.2) and (6.3) we have 
 
t 1 t t w y ε + γ = −  (5.2) 
 
Thus, it appears that we also need to control a dynamic process. However, our 
one-period objective function differs markedly from the standard objective 
function of the dual control literature (6.1). 
  Note that intuitively strict inflation targeting in our model can be re-
interpreted in terms of the dual control literature. For, strict inflation targeting can 
be thought of as the case where the CB is only interested in minimizing 
 
2 *
t t t t ) r r ( ) r , y ( L − =  (6.4) 
 
that is, in stabilizing the interest rate at its – time-dependent – target level, where 

























=  (5.8) 
 
Of course, this is simply the case where the central bank – in implementing 
inflation targeting under imperfect knowledge of the term structure of interest 
rates – follows its optimal monetary policy rule under learning (with coincides 
with the passive policy). Thus, the main difference with the standard literature on  
30 
learning and control is that in our case the regression to be estimated is different 
from the process to be controlled, as yt does not appear in our utility function.
23 
  Conversely, if we set λ  =  0 in (6.1) the central bank’s objective function 
coincides with the input-target model that is often used in studies of learning by 
doing such as Jovanovich and Nyarko (1996) and Foster and Rosenzweig (1995). 
In this case it is also possible to back out an optimal level of the control rt, ie a 
certain monetary policy setting that now does not minimizes deviations of 
inflation from the target, but tries to minimize the deviation between the signal yt 
and a certain target level. 
  Since there is an intuitive correspondence between this target level and the 
state variable  1 t t t R ˆ E x + = , we can think of this case as the case where the central 
bank is interested in learning the true value of the level of market expectations per 
se. Thus, here the CB is not targeting inflation, but is targeting ‘knowledge about 
the markets’. 
  Then the question is what could be the value of ‘experimentation’ in our 
model? The answer is: a higher sample variance of wt leads to a more precise 
estimate. That is the central bank can engineer a higher volatility in wt by ‘not 
stabilizing the shocks too well’. This means that the central bank should deviate 
from the optimal reaction function (5.8) for the case of strict inflation targeting, 
rule such that the process for wt becomes more volatile. Some intuition for this is 
provided by Figure 6.1. 
 
                                                 
23 That is, we have the central bank which is estimating the process of private sector expectation 
formation with wt on the RHS of the regression. Since wt never settles down due to supply and 
demand shocks, we have central bank beliefs converging with probability 1 to the truth, ie 
Therefore in our model, the central bank’s passive learning policy will lead in the limit to the full 
information rational expectations solution.  
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Figure 6.1  Constant interest rate rule – convergence of the 
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Figure 6.1 displays the first 100 of 10.000 observations on the convergence of the 
parameter estimate under a constant real interest rate rule, more specifically for 
the case where the real interest rate stays at is equilibrium or neutral level – which 
here is normalized at zero. If we compare Figure 6.1 with Figure 5.3 – which 
illustrates convergence under the optimal interest rate rule – we have an important 
result. The speed of convergence under a constant interest rate rule is much higher 
than under the optimal rule! 
  This suggests that indeed there is a trade-off between learning and control if 
the signal enters the utility function. So, in the case that (yt – y*) is an argument in 
the central bank’s loss function – that is if λ ≠ 0 in equation (6.1), we are back in 
the neighbourhood of the standard dual control literature and the separation 
principle will break down, indicating that estimation and control cannot be 
separated. 
  However, it is hard to see how the objective function (6.1) can be justified. 
Inflation targeting has become the dominant monetary policy strategy for the 
major central banks in the world since the late 1990s.
24 So, it is clear that the 
deviation of inflation from its assigned target should be in their objective function. 
                                                 
24 Some central banks – like the Bank of Canada, the Bank of England and the Reserve Bank of 
Australia – have explicitly chosen inflation (forecast) targeting framework as their disciplinary 
framework. Other central banks – such as the European Central Bank and US Federal Reserve 
System – have implicitly incorporated many elements of inflation targeting in their monetary 
analysis and policy strategy.  
32 
Why, however, would the central bank be interested in limiting the deviation 
between its noisy observations of market expectations, yt, and the true values of 
those expectations? The only clear rationale would be if it needs to know those 
market expectations as an essential part of the monetary transmission mechanism. 
This is the avenue we have followed in this paper. However, apart from the need 
to learn these expectations for the sake of controlling inflation there is no reason 
whatsoever why understanding those expectations in itself should be one of the 
goals of monetary policy. Therefore, there is no good case for having λ different 
from 0 and therefore also no good case supporting a trade-off between estimation 
and control. Therefore, this model suggests that the practical relevance of the 
breakdown of the separation principle and the need for experimentation in policy 
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Convergence of stochastic recursive algorithms 












t ) w ( t R  (A1.1) 
 
Then in estimating the model yt = γwt–1 + εt, the least squares formula for the 
parameter estimate ct can be written in recursive form 
 




1 t t − − −
− −
− − + =  
 
or replacing yt by γwt–1 + εt, 
 




1 t t ε + − γ + = − − −
− −
−  (A1.2) 
 
(A1.1) can also be written in recursive form 
 




1 t t − −
−
− − + =  (A1.3) 
 
(the system (1A) and (1C) is the same as Evans and Honkapohja (2001) (hereafter 
EH) equation (2.9) pp. 33). 
  To put (A1.2) and (A1.3) in standard form we rather use Rt–1 instead of Rt on 
the RHS of this equation. The appropriate way to handle it is to define another 
variable S such that St–1 = Rt (see EH page 37). The system then becomes 
 








−  (A1.4) 
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+ =  (A1.5) 
 
Next rewrite equation (A1.4) as 
 








−  (A1.4’) 
 
where T implicitly defines the mapping from the PLM to the ALM  
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() γ = −1 t c T  (A1.6) 
 
The interpretation of the ALM is that it describes the stochastic process followed 
by the economy if forecasts are made under the fixed rule given by the PLM. Here 
of course that stochastic process, the ALM, is the data generating process (DGP) 
(here the sample is generated by nature) – which is independent of the PLM – and 
the PLM is the recursive estimate of the ALM (or nature). 
  The system (A1.4’)–(A1.5) is now implicitly in standard form with the 
following definition of variables: 
 
1
t t 1 t t t t t t t g and )' , w , w ( X ; )' S , c (
−
− = ε = = θ  
 
So the system (A1.4’)–(A1.5) can now be written as 
 
) X , , t ( Q g t 1 t t 1 t t − − θ + θ = θ  (A1.7) 
 
In the case above the state vector Xt follows an exogenous stochastic process; ie 
the sample has been generated by nature. However, as pointed out by EH, p. 35 
this is not at all essential. In particular, in the general framework, Xt can be 
permitted to follow a VAR (vector autoregression) with parameters that depend 
on )' S , c ( 1 t 1 t 1 t − − − = θ . Evans and Honkapohja (2001) state that this issue is 
discussed fully in Chapters 6 and 7 of their book, and is relevant for the cases of 
passive and optimal learning. 
  The function Q expresses the way in which the estimate θt–1 (or rather a 
vector of parameter estimates or beliefs) is revised in line with last period’s 
observations. Here, θt–1 will include all components of ct–1 and St–1, = Rt, Xt is the 
state vector that includes the effects of wt, wt–1 and εt, and gt is a deterministic 
sequence of ‘gains’ – ie a non-increasing sequence of positive numbers – 
satisfying  1 tg lim t t =
∞ → . We are interested in the conditions under which  θ = θ
∞ → t t lim , 
where  θ solves either  ( ) 0 , X EQ t = θ  in the case that {Xt} is drawn from a 
distribution that is stationary or  ( ) 0 , X EQ lim t t = θ
∞ →  in the case that {Xt} is 
asymptotically stationary (for the latter case see Appendix A1.B)). 
  As pointed out by Sargent (1993, 39–41), it has been discovered that the 
limiting behavior of a sequence {θt} determined by stochastic difference equation 
(A1.7) is described by an associated differential equation, 
 









where EQ(X,θ) is the expected value of Q(X,θ), evaluated with respect to the 
asymptotic stationary distribution of {Xt} and τ denotes ‘notional’ or ‘artificial’ 
time (see EH pp. 31). 
  Having shown that the system can be placed in standard SRA (stochastic 
recursive algorithm) form, the next step is to compute the associated ODE. 
Therefore, we have to compute EQ(X,θ). 
  The easiest way to do this is to look at the two components of Q separately. 
The first component of Q, giving the revisions to ct–1 is given by 
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1 t t 1 t c ) c ) c ( T ( w w S ) X , , t ( Q ε + − = θ − − − −
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= θ  (A1.11) 
 
Hence fixing the value of c and S and computing the expectation over Xt we get 
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t ) w ( Var Ew Ew σ = = = − , 0 Ew t 1 t = ε − , and  1 ) 1 t /( t lim
t = +
∞ →  we obtain 
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=  (A1.12) 
 
S ) S , c ( h
2








t Ew Ew σ = = −  is the unconditional second moment of wt. In the case 







t Ew Ew σ = = −  exists one can, for example, permit wt to follow a 
stationary exogenous AR (autoregressive) process, driven by a white noise shock 
with bounded moments.  
38 
  The stochastic approximation approach associates an ordinary differential 
equation (ODE) with the stochastic recursive algorithm, 
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τ θ = θ =
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θ
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We can write the differential equation component by component to obtain 
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= τ = =
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τ  (A1.12’) 
 
S )) ( S ( h ) S , X ( EQ
d
dS 2
w − σ = τ = =
τ
τ  (A1.13’) 
 
As pointed out by EH, p. 38 this system is recursive (that is we ‘first’ compute the 
variance of the estimated parameter, or the ‘Kalman gain’ and then proceed in 
updating the estimate) and the second equation is globally stable
25 with 
2
w S σ →  





 from any starting point, provided 
S is different from zero along the path, and hence that the stability of the 
differential equations (A1.12’) and (A1.13’) is determined entirely by the stability 
of the smaller dimension non-homogenous equation 
 
γ + − = = − =
τ





where I have used (A1.6). 
 Clearly  c  =  γ is a stationary solution. The general solution [see eg Sargent 
(1993, p. 41)] is 
 
t e ) ) 0 ( c ( ) t ( c
− γ − + γ =  
 
which converges to γ for any initial value c(0). 
 
 
                                                 
25 Clearly S = 
2
w σ  is a stationary solution. The general solution [see eg Sargent (1993, p. 41)] is 
S(t) = 
2
w σ  + (S(0) – 
2
w σ )e
–1 which converges to 
2
w σ  for any initial value S(0).  
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A1.B  Convergence under passive learning 
In the case where the central bank engages in estimation and control the data 
generating process for wt is not exogeneous anymore. Rather it follows an AR(1) 
process where the coefficient on the lagged term is a function of ct. To see this, 
first solve for the long-term real interest rate. Substituting (5.8) into equation (2.4) 
and combining the result with (4.7’) we obtain 
 





t w ) c k z
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=  (A1.16) 
 
Then, we need the equilibrium equations for inflation and output gap
26: 
 
[] [] 1 t t t t t 1 t d ) c ( k 1 z ) c ( k 1 z + + + π γ − − − γ − − − =  (A1.17) 
 
1 t t t 1 t z + + η − + π = π  (A1.18) 
 
Then adding (A1.17) and (A1.18) we get 
 
1 t 1 t t t t 1 t 1 t d ) z )( c ( k z + + + + η + + + π γ − = + π  (A1.19) 
 
or, in terms of wt 
 
) d ( w ) c ( k w 1 t 1 t t t 1 t + + + η + − γ − =  (A1.20) 
 
The difference with the case of an exogenous data sequence is that now we need 
to make sure that 
2
t t Ew lim
∞ →  (which depends on the magnitude of  ) c ( k t γ −  in the 
AR(1) process) exits and is finite. The reason is that since we are interested in 
local convergence, it is necessary that in deriving the ODE, the process (A1.20) 
be asymptotically stationary. For this we need to have ct = c sufficiently close to γ 
(the fixed point of interest) such that  1 ) c ( k < γ − . Then the process 
 
) d ( w ) c ( k w 1 t 1 t t 1 t + + + η + − γ − =  (A1.21) 
 




Denote the stationary points for c and S by c  and S respectively. The ODE 
system is 
 
                                                 
26 The solution for the output gap z can readily be obtained by substituting (A1.16) into (2.3).  
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Then as in Appendix (A1.A) the stability of the ODE system (A1.22) and (A1.23) 
depends on the local stability of (A1.22) at  γ = c . The general solution in real 
time will be 
 
t e ) ) 0 ( c ( ) t ( c
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Optimal monetary policy under perfect knowledge 
The central bank chooses 
∞
























1 t t 1 t 1 t z + + η − α + π = π  (A2.2) 
 
1 t t 2 t 1 1 t d R z z + + + β − β =  (A2.3) 
 
1 t t t t R E ˆ k r ) k 1 ( R + + − =  (A2.4) 
 
We can reformulate the problem above as choosing the indirect control variable 
∞
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1 t t t 1 t u x x + + ξ + + =  (A2.6) 
 
where   E x 1 t t t + π =  is the new state variable,    z E u 1 t t 1 t + α =  is the new control 
variable and  1 t 1 1 t 1 t d + + + α + η − = ξ .
27 We solve this problem by the method of 
Lagrange multipliers.
28 
  The Lagrangian for this problem is 
 
                                                 
27 Equation (A2.6) is derived by leading (A1.18) by one period and taking expectations as of time 
t+1. This gives Et+1πt+2 = πt+2 + a1zt+1. The RHS variables can be decomposed as follows: 
πt+1 = Etπt+1 – ηt+1 and α1zt+1 = α1(Etzt+1 + dt+1). Then we have Et+1πt+2 = Etπt+1 + α1Etzt+1 –
 ηt+1 + α1dt+1. 
28 For a discussion of the relative merits of the methods of dynamic programming and Lagrange, 
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= µ δ =
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+  (A2.8) 
 
0 E *) x (
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∂
∂
+  (A2.9) 
 
From equation (A2.8) we have Etµt+1 = 0. Using this result in equation (A2.9) 
gives 
 
*) x ( t t π − − = µ  (A2.10) 
 
Leading equation (A2.10) by one period and taking expectations at time t yields 
 
*) x E ( E 1 t t 1 t t π − − = µ + +  (A2.11) 
 
Since we have defined xt+1 = Et+1πt+2, using (A2.8) and the law of iterated 
expectations the first order condition can be expressed as 
 
* E 2 t t π = π +  (A2.12) 
 






In the case of passive learning at stage 1 the central bank first forms a sample 
estimate of the unknown parameter γ, and takes this estimate ct as given when it 
subsequently sets policy at stage 2 in the same period. Thus, the setup of the 
problem is similar to the case of perfect knowledge analyzed in Appendix 2 – but 
with the additional simplifications that π* = 0 and α1 = 1. 
  The model can now be written as follows. For the output gap, as before we 
decompose zt+1 into the central bank’s forecast Etzt+1 and its forecast error. To do 
this, first take expectations of (A2.3) and (A2.4) at time t 
 
] R E ˆ [ kE r ) k 1 ( z z E 1 t t t 2 t 2 t 1 1 t t + + β − − β − β =  (A3.1) 
 
Combining (A3.1) with equation (5.6) we get 
 
t t 2 t t 2 t 2 t 1
t t 2 t 2 t 1 1 t t
z kc kc r ) k 1 ( z
w kc r ) k 1 ( z z E
β + π β + − β − β =
β − − β − β = +  (A3.1’) 
 
The actual process for zt+1 is given by 
 
1 t t 2 t 2 t 2 t 1 1 t d z k k r ) k 1 ( z z + + + γ β + γπ β + − β − β =  (A3.2) 
 
Subtracting (A3.1’) from (A3.2) yields 
 
'
1 t 1 t t
'
1 t t t 2 t 2 t t 2 1 1 t
d z E




+ π β + − β − β + β =
 (A3.3) 
 
Note that now the output equation becomes nonlinear. This can be seen from the 
presence of the ‘product terms’ ctzt and ctπt on the right-hand side of (A3.3). 
 The  term  1 t t t t 2
'
1 t d ) z )( c ( k d + + + + π γ − β − =  is the central bank’s forecast error 
with respect to next period’s level of the output gap. Compared to the case of 
perfect knowledge it can be seen that this error now consists of two terms: (i) the 
additive demand shock dt+1, and (ii) a term that depends on its recursive forecast 
error of market expectations of next period’s long real interest rate 
) z )( c ( k t t t 2 + π γ − β − . It is clear that if  γ → t c,   1 t
'
1 t d d + + →  and results collapse to 
those under prefect knowledge (for the case that π* = 0 and α1 = 1).  
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  The algebra is now the same as in Appendix 2, except that we have 
'
1 t d +  
instead of dt+1. That is, we can reformulate the problem above as choosing the 
indirect control variable 
∞
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1 t t t 1 t u x x + + ξ + + =  (A3.5) 
 
where all variables are defined as before and 
'
1 t 1 t
'
1 t d + + + + η − = ξ . 
  Following the same logic as in Appendix 2, the first order condition can be 
expressed as 
 
0 E 2 t t = π +  (A3.6) 
 





Optimal learning with variable gain and variable prediction 
variance 
The central bank chooses 
∞
= τ τ t } r {  so as to maximize (A2.1) subject to (A2.2) and 
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The first order conditions are 
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From equation (A4.9) and (A4.12) we have and  0 E
2




t = µ = µ +  
respectively. Then, from (A4.11) we see that  0 E
3
1 t t t = µ ϖ + . Using, this 
information (A4.14), (A4.15) and (A4.10) simplify to 
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Since we are dealing with the case of a non-zero gain, (A4.11) implies  0 E
3
1 t t = µ + . 
Then (A4.16) simplifies to 
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Using (A4.16’’) in (A4.14’) and (A4.15’) we get 
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Now it can easily be seen that the term in square brackets appearing before 
7
1 t t E + µ  
is zero by definition. To see this note that the constraints containing the Kalman 
gain  κt+1 (ie (A4.5) and (A4.4)) imply that  t t t
1 2
t ) z ( ) ( ϖ − = + π σ ψ
−
ε . With this 












t = µ δ + µ − +  (A4.15’’’) 
 
These equations correspond with the first order conditions (A2.8) and (A2.9) 
respectively for the case of perfect knowledge (see Appendix 2).
29 
  Hence, the first order condition is 
 
0 E 2 t t = π +  (A3.6) 
                                                 
29 There  0
2
t = µ  as we have only one constraint, formulated in terms of the inflation forecast 
xt = Etπt+1 rather then in terms of the actual inflation rate, and the output forecast Etzt+1 becomes 
the (indirect) control. 
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